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the targeted beneficiaries? In addition, the Article examines the current political and administrative state of
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INTRODUCTION
Tax credits—particularly refundable tax credits—are seen
increasingly as a social policy magic bullet. In late 2005, President
1
Bush’s Tax Reform Panel recommended substituting uniform work
2
and family credits for the earned income tax credit (“EITC”), the
3
4
child tax credit (“CTC”), personal exemptions, and the standard
5
deduction. In his 2006 book, Making America Work, Jonathan Barry
*
Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. I
thank the participants and organizers of the Janet Spragens Memorial Symposium on
Low-Income Earners and the Federal Tax System. I also thank Janet Holtzblatt and
Michelle Kane. I received invaluable research assistance from Lauren Daniels Laitin.
1. THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, FINAL REPORT,
SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM (2005),
available at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/. The final report was
issued on November 1, 2005.
2. I.R.C. § 32 (2000).
3. Id. § 24.
4. Id. § 151.
5. Id. § 152.
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Forman, a long-time participant in tax-transfer debates, proposed
substituting all existing welfare programs with refundable tax credits,
6
including a universal $2,000 per-person credit. And in an extremely
important article appearing in the October 2006 issue of the Stanford
Law Review, Lily Batchelder, Fred Goldberg, and Peter Orszag argued
that the optimal delivery mechanism for all socially valued incentives
7
embedded in the tax code is the uniform refundable tax credit.
Each of these efforts addresses longstanding shortcomings
associated with tax-transfer systems, including: (1) multiple phaseouts of crisscrossing, uncoordinated tax, and transfer programs;
(2) inequitable and inefficient marriage penalties on low-income
workers; and (3) distortionary work versus leisure incentives whereby
low-income taxpayers face marginal tax rates that can exceed 100
8
percent.
For at least twenty years, tax policy experts have studied and
publicized the problems endemic to running social programs
9
through the tax code. Concerns among economists and policy
6. JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK (2006). A universal benefit
could simplify the current collection of tax credits, particularly with respect to
standardizing qualifying definitions, coordinating phase-outs, and eliminating
marriage penalties. However, thoughtful commentators have questioned the
prudence of running all social welfare programs through the tax code. According to
Janet Holtzblatt of the Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Analysis, for instance,
doling out social welfare benefits through the tax system could overwhelm the
administration of the federal income tax and raise compliance costs for low-income
claimants unfamiliar with participating in the positive tax system. For a summary of
Holtzblatt’s remarks, see Kurt Ritterpusch, Proposal to Revamp Low-Income Benefits with
Refundable Credits Lauded, Criticized, DAILY TAX REP., Nov. 8, 2006, at G-4 (describing
Holtzblatt’s concerns about a universal tax credit, though noting her overall sense
that the proposal is “appealing”).
7. See Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Janet Holtzblatt & Peter R. Orszag,
Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credit, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24
(2006) (predicting that such credits would provide “a much more even and
widespread motivation for socially valued behavior than the current set of tax
incentives”).
8. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income Households, 84
TAX NOTES 1191, 1200 (1999) (illustrating that “at some margins—including even an
earnings increase from $10,000 to $25,000 for some households—the marginal rate
exceeds 100 percent”). Recent legislative changes to tax rules affecting low-income
taxpayers, particularly expansions to the standard deduction and personal
exemption as well as a new ten percent tax bracket, have mitigated somewhat these
extreme effects.
9. Economist Gene Steuerle has been particularly indefatigable in educating
policymakers as to the counterproductive labor supply effects of the U.S. transfer
system. See, e.g., C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX DECADE: HOW TAXES CAME TO
DOMINATE THE PUBLIC AGENDA 124 (1992) (reporting that due to expansions to the
EITC in 1986, combined direct marginal tax rates on low-income workers, including
state income taxes, topped forty-five percent); Steuerle, Combined Tax Rates And AFDC
Recipients, 69 TAX NOTES 501, 501 (1995) (writing that despite increases to the EITC,
“it is virtually unprofitable” for the typical welfare recipient “to work in the formal or
above-ground economy”); Steuerle, Giving Jobs to Welfare Recipients: The Tax Rates They
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experts over high marginal tax rates for the poor have animated
policy discussions over tax-transfer programs since at least 1969 when
President Nixon introduced his ill-fated Family Assistance Plan
10
(“FAP”) and its cornerstone negative income tax.
Heeding the
advice of experts, however, will not solve all of the problems
associated with tax-transfer programs. Coordinating phase-outs,
eliminating marriage penalties, and deploying uniform refundable
tax credits or universal tax subsidies will not address a more
fundamental conundrum that has plagued tax transfers for over
thirty years: What exactly are we trying to accomplish by delivering
social welfare benefits through the tax system? This article will
explore this systemic question, and pose two further questions. First,
what and who are we targeting when we advocate tax-transfer
programs like the EITC? And, second, are our current efforts
effectively assisting the targeted beneficiaries? In addition, this article
will discuss the current political and administrative state of the EITC,
and recommend several ways in which the EITC, already the largest
anti-poverty program in the United States, can further expand its
reach and efficacy.

Face, 69 TAX NOTES 641, 641 (1995) (finding marginal tax rates for welfare recipients
above seventy-five percent); Steuerle, Moynihan Was Right: The Health Issue Is Welfare
and Taxation, 63 TAX NOTES 1051, 1051 (1994) (noting that for persons living just
above the poverty level, “the current combined marginal tax rate is already about 50
percent”); Steuerle, The True Tax Rate Structure, 69 TAX NOTES 371, 371 (1995)
(noting that phase-outs of tax-transfer and direct-transfer programs create the
perverse result whereby “the highest marginal rates are faced at low- and moderateincome levels”); C. Eugene Steuerle & Paul Wilson, The Taxation of Poor and LowerIncome Workers, 34 TAX NOTES 695, 696 (1987) (observing that “[w]hen the implicit
tax rates from the phasing out of welfare and other transfer programs are combined
with the implicit and explicit tax rates in the direct tax programs . . . low-wage
workers often face higher marginal tax rates than most other groups in society”).
10. A negative income tax (“NIT”) provides a lump-sum payment to persons with
zero income. It phases out the payment at some percentage rate (typically around
fifty percent) as income rises from zero to a specified point at which benefits
disappear entirely. During the phase out of the NIT payment, taxpayers effectively
incur marginal taxes in addition to those imposed by the positive tax system,
resulting in effective tax rates exceeding the statutory rates. For a discussion of
Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan and the political and economic history of negative
income taxation, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The
Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN FAMILIES 15-31 (Bruce D. Meyer &
Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., 2001); see also VINCENT J. BURKE & VEE BURKE, NIXON’S
GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM (1974) (examining the political forces behind Nixon’s
proposal to expand the welfare state); DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A
GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN
(1973) (recounting the author’s participation in the unsuccessful FAP legislation).
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CLARIFYING THE GOALS AND OUTCOMES OF THE EITC

Question #1: What exactly are we trying to accomplish by delivering social
welfare benefits through the tax system?
Historically, advocates of tax-transfer programs have perceived
multiple benefits to administering social-welfare programs through
the tax code. These benefits include obvious, structural advantages
such as lower administrative costs. In the case of the EITC, would-be
tax-transfer claimants self-declare eligibility simply by filing a tax
return. Delivering benefits through the tax code can also be more
efficient and even operate as a counter-cyclical device, particularly if
transfer payments are reflected in regular paychecks, a feature
offered—but severely underutilized—in the current EITC’s “advance
11
The structural advantages of tax-transfer
payment” option.
programs such as the EITC also include a less intrusive administrative
presence. Unlike traditional transfer programs administered outside
the tax system, tax-transfer programs do not require claimants to
interact with social welfare workers to initiate or continue receiving
benefits. Generally, a claimant need only prove eligibility by filing an
12
extra form with the Internal Revenue Service, the Schedule EIC.
11. I.R.C. § 3507 (2000). Receiving EITC benefits in regular paychecks is the
equivalent of receiving a steady percentage of one’s tax refund throughout the year;
the taxpayer gets the advantage of having the money sooner rather than later, and
the government foregoes the benefit of what would otherwise amount to a tax-free
loan from the taxpayer. There is no consensus among policy experts as to why such a
small percentage of low-income workers (under ten percent) take advantage of the
advance payment option. Janet Holtzblatt of the U.S. Department of Treasury’s
Office of Tax Analysis has speculated that the low take-up rate could involve a
reluctance among low-income workers “to provide their employers with more
information about their family or financial situations. It is also likely that employees
do not request advances of the EITC because of the costs it would impose on
employers who must [] compute and track advance payments.” Interview with Janet
Holtzblatt, Deputy Director of the Individual Taxation Division in the Department of
the Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis, in 8 GEO. PUBLIC POL’Y REV. 54, 63 (2002)
[hereinafter Holtzblatt Interview]. Moreover, for workers, “there is also a risk that they
may receive too much of the credit in advance and end up having to pay some of it
back at the end of the year.” Id.
12. I.R.S., Schedule EIC (Form 1040A or 1040): Earned Income Credit
Qualifying Child Information, available at http:// www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/
f1040sei.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). While the administrative interaction may be
less intrusive for EITC claimants than for welfare claimants, the process of claiming
benefits can still be intimidating and time-consuming. IRS Publication 596 assists
would-be eligibles in claiming the credit, but for tax year 2006, the publication was
an astonishing fifty-eight pages long.
The complexity of EITC eligibility
requirements forces the majority of EITC claimants to use paid return preparers,
burdening claimants with costs that reduce the value of their EITC benefits, and
making them vulnerable to incompetent and even fraudulent return preparation
services. Infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. Leslie Book has argued that the
lack of interaction with tax administrators—described above as a benefit—results in
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The sum total of these administrative benefits results in lower costs
and higher participation rates relative to direct transfer programs.
The IRS administers the EITC at a cost between 1.00 and 1.85
13
percent of benefits paid. By comparison, estimated administrative
costs for Food Stamps range between twenty and twenty-five percent
of program benefits, while administrative costs for welfare programs
14
equal ten percent of benefits.
In addition, considerably higher
percentages of EITC eligibles participate compared to other transfer
programs. The EITC boasts participation rates as high as eighty-nine
15
percent, while the Food Stamps program achieves a participation
16
rate closer to seventy percent.
It should already be clear that these benefits—lower administrative
costs, greater efficiency, less intrusion and coercion—are all defined
vis-à-vis “welfare.” In fact, one of the primary explanations for why we
deliver transfer payments through the tax system is to position these
programs opposite welfare.
deficient customer service for low-income taxpayers as well as higher noncompliance
rates. Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net, 81
OR. L. REV. 351, 355 (2002). Book suggests implementing free or low-cost tax
representation in the EITC audit process to “help resolve the tension between the
legitimate government interest in reducing EITC error rates through compliance
efforts directed at low-income taxpayers and ensuring that the EITC’s intended
beneficiaries continue to receive the support to which they are entitled.” Id.
13. Compare Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers,
in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 161 n.26 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds.,
2004) (placing the cost estimate at one percent of benefits), with Lawrence Zelenak,
Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV.
1867, 1884 (2005) (concluding the cost is no more than 1.85 percent of benefits).
14. Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1881-82 (placing the total administrative cost of
Food Stamps at $4 to $5 billion annually, out of $20 billion total, and the cost of
TANF at $2.3 billion of $23.2 billion annually).
15. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1004-05 (2005). Weisbach and Nussim base their eightynine percent figure on a 2001 study conducted by the General Accounting Office,
which tallied participation as a percentage of total credit that households were
eligible to claim rather than strictly as a percentage of participating eligible
households. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
ELIGIBILITY AND PARTICIPATION 3 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getr
pt?GAO-02-290R (“The amount foregone by nonparticipating households
represented about 11.1 percent of the total credit that households were eligible to
claim.”). Until a more recent study is conducted using tax return microdata (such a
study is currently underway as a joint project of the IRS and Treasury), Janet
Holtzblatt suggests representing the participation rate as a range between seventy-five
and eighty-six percent, reflecting the conclusions of the three most prominent
studies of EITC participation rates since 1994. Telephone Interview with Janet
Holtzblatt, U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Tax Analysis, in Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Janet Holtzblatt].
16. MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., TRENDS IN FOOD STAMP PROGRAM
PARTICIPATION RATES: 1994-2000 2-5 (2002), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/oan
e/MENU/Published/FSP/FILES/Participation/Trends94-00.pdf.
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The history of the EITC is a case in point. Congress enacted the
low-income credit in 1975 because politicians viewed it as a work17
It flourished
oriented alternative to existing welfare programs.
when beneficiaries were perceived as deserving workers. But it faced
increasing threats when claimants began to resemble the apocryphal
welfare cheat who bilked the government and lived off the dole; that
is, when noncompliance rates for the program skyrocketed to thirty18
five and forty percent in the 1980s and 1990s. Only after supporters
of the EITC mounted a protracted effort demonstrating the
19
program’s pro-work, anti-welfare features did the threats subside.
Thus, delivering transfer payments through the tax system requires
a precarious balancing act. Tax transfers must navigate not only
administrative and economic priorities surrounding social welfare
policy. They must also negotiate the treachery of welfare politics,
and, in particular, avoid all associations with the moniker, “welfare.”
While tax transfers can be effective in shielding work support
programs from the politics of welfare, we may view the policy trend
toward tax transfers and away from direct transfers as an opportunity
to jump directly into the lion’s den, re-imagining our definition of
welfare itself. Indeed, one could argue that the sum of “ending
welfare as we know it” plus “making work pay” equals a twenty-first
century, work-oriented welfare state. Rather than restrict our notion
of welfare, we expand it to include the “deserving poor” in the form
of the working poor.
This goal is fraught with difficulties. “Welfare” has fallen almost
completely off the public agenda since 1996, the year Congress
17. Ventry, supra note 10, at 23-26.
18. In fact, according to the IRS Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program
(“TCMP”) study for tax year 1985, as many as forty-six percent of taxpayers who
claimed the EITC may not have been entitled to the payment received. The
overclaim rate for that year, calculated as the dollar amount claimed in error divided
by the total dollar amount claimed, was closer to thirty-nine percent. John Karl
Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, Compliance, and Antipoverty
Effectiveness, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 63, 69 tbl.2 (1994). The Treasury responded to high
error rates with a simplification package designed to increase compliance by
clarifying EITC eligibility rules and enhancing IRS verification of claims. See Janet
Holtzblatt, Administering Refundable Tax Credits: Lessons from the EITC Experience, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 180-86 (Nat’l
Tax Ass’n ed., 1991). The 1988 TCMP study, released in 1992, reported a drop in
the overclaim rate from 39.1 to 35.4%. See Scholz, supra. Notwithstanding the
concentrated compliance efforts and steady reduction in error rates, analysts critical
of the program continued to report that EITC error rates hovered around fifty
percent. See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, FRAUD IN THE ELECTRONIC FILING PROGRAM: A
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (Sept. 1993) (unpublished report prepared for the
Internal Revenue Service).
19. See Ventry, supra note 10, at 37-41 (describing the counterattack and IRS
analysis used to defend the EITC).
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devolved national welfare policy to the states, and replaced the muchmaligned Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) with
20
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”). Attempts to
reignite public discourse over welfare, and expand rather than
contract its constituent parts could prove disastrous. If tax credits
like the EITC became linked with welfare, they might cease to exist.
Ideally, the poor and disadvantaged would be better off with a system
of social provisions that recognized public assistance as a matter of
right—as an entitlement—much like the basic income guarantees in
21
many countries throughout the world.
In re-conceiving
longstanding notions of “welfare,” and expanding the inventory of
“welfare” programs to include tax-transfer programs and their
beneficiaries, however, we raise the possibility of losing our most
effective anti-poverty programs.
We might have more success in expanding our notion of “work”
rather than of “welfare.” Recently, Noah Zatz has compared the
definition of work in the EITC and TANF, showing that “work” for
EITC purposes equates exclusively with earnings from employment
or self-employment, while “work” for TANF purposes is substantially
more flexible, and includes unsubsidized employment, subsidized
private sector employment, work experience, on-the-job training, job
search and job readiness assistance, community service programs,
20. Two of the most thoughtful welfare reform scholars and advocates of the last
thirty years, Joel Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld, have recently written that after
President Clinton signed the 1996 welfare reform legislation, “welfare” “dropped out
of the political discourse and is virtually forgotten.” JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL
HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 1 (2007). For the 1996
welfare law, see Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
21. The basic income guarantee (“BIG”)—also called a universal basic income,
guaranteed annual income, negative income tax, universal tax credit, among
others—has been adopted in some form or another in Brazil, Portugal, Belgium, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and even the state of Alaska, which guarantees
each resident a share of the state’s oil reserves from the Alaska Permanent Fund
Dividend. In the United States, the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network (“USBIG
Network”), founded in 1999, has promoted the idea of a basic income, which it
defines as “a government insured guarantee that no citizen’s income will fall below
some minimal level for any reason.” The U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network,
http://www.usbig.net/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). All citizens, according to the
USBIG Network, “would receive a BIG without means test or work requirement.” Id.
The USBIG website includes an extensive bibliography (over 2000 citations) on basic
income plans, both in the United States and throughout the world. See id. For two
reviews of recent scholarship on the basic income concept, see Karl Widerquist,
Perspectives on the Guaranteed Income, Part I, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 749 (2001) and Karl
Widerquist, Perspectives on the Guaranteed Income, Part II, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 1019
(2001). For an excellent philosophical discussion of basic income guarantees, see
Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing: Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Requirements, 52
EMORY L.J. 1 (2003).
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vocational educational training, and providing child care services to
22
If TANF claimants
persons participating in community service.
perform at least twenty hours of “work” from the above activities,
moreover, they may also participate in three additional forms of
work, all unpaid: job skills training directly related to employment;
education directly related to employment for non-high school
graduates; and high school or GED coursework for non-high school
23
graduates. Although the list of what qualifies as work under TANF
emphasizes the attainment of paid employment, it is considerably
more expansive than the narrow category of work recognized for
receipt of EITC benefits. Among the states, there is further variation
with respect to permitting TANF recipients to satisfy work
requirements from unpaid activities, which includes unpaid
community service, care for family members suffering from physical
disabilities or severe health problems, and subsistence production to
24
meet basic household needs.
Two points are worth emphasizing in comparing “work supports”
in the nation’s largest tax-transfer program and its largest directtransfer program. First, “welfare” in the twenty-first century requires
that recipients work, seek work, or develop sufficient skills to attain
work. There are no free lunches under the welfare state as we have
come to know it. Second, unlike welfare, the EITC “makes work pay”
only if the work takes place in the paid labor market. The EITC does
not reward unpaid work, efforts to find work, or skills training that
facilitates paid employment. “Work” under the EITC remains
categorical, strictly limited to current paid employment, and
generally less inclusive than “work” for welfare purposes.
22. Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1140-41 (2006).
23. Id. at 1140.
24. Id. at 1135. Far from perfect “laboratories of democracy,” the states
nonetheless provide creative variations on the definition of work for welfare
programs as well as on the design of state-level EITCs. Currently, twenty states
(including the District of Columbia) offer state-level EITCs, as do two local
governments, Montgomery County, Maryland and Denver, Colorado. Most states use
the federal model as a starting point, but then offer variations designed to suit the
needs of regional concerns. Minnesota, for instance, has extended the phase-in
range of the credit due to concerns over high marginal tax rates for recipients in the
phase-out range of other transfer programs. Wisconsin, meanwhile, includes a third
tier for families with three or more children; the federal EITC only differentiates
between families with one child and two or more children. See, e.g., IFIE OKWUJE &
NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A RISING NUMBER OF STATE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS ARE HELPING WORKING FAMILIES ESCAPE POVERTY (2006),
http://www.cbpp.org/10-12-06sfp.pdf; TAX POLICY CTR., STATE EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDITS BASED ON THE FEDERAL EITC, TAX YEAR 2006 (2006),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxFacts/TFDB/Content/PDF/state_eitc.pdf.
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A fourth potential benefit of delivering social welfare through the
tax system rather than through direct expenditure programs may
involve our desire to hide these programs in the tax system. We
might seek the cloak of the tax code for several reasons, including:
(1) the hope that opponents of a generous social welfare state will
not find out what we are doing, (2) to de-stigmatize and legitimize
tax-transfer programs by tying them and their beneficiaries to the
unassailable virtue of work, and (3) to prevent the programs from
having to undergo the annual scrutiny of the general appropriations
process. As to the last motivation, the EITC, for one, became a
25
permanent part of the tax code in 1978, and if Congress wants to defund it, it must do so explicitly.
Practically speaking, the “hidden” welfare state embedded in the
26
tax code was exposed long ago. Since 1974, Congress has required
the Treasury Department to produce an annual, current-year
accounting of tax expenditures to accompany the President’s direct
27
expenditure budget. Programs like the EITC remained under the
radar for many years, because they were small in number and size. In
2005, however, social welfare provisions contained in the tax
expenditure budget totaled $576 billion, nearly sixty-five percent of
28
all tax expenditures.
Tax-transfer programs no longer enjoy
anonymity.
Question #2: What and who are we targeting when we advocate tax-transfer
programs like the EITC?
29

Are we defending wage subsidies?
Income supplements?
30
Negative income taxes? Are we providing a “work bonus”? Are we
defending progressivity by adding it to the bottom of the income
25. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
26. For the tax expenditure budget as reflecting the “hidden welfare state,” see
CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE (1997); Jeffrey P. Owens, Tax
expenditures and direct expenditures as instruments of social policy, in COMPARATIVE TAX
STUDIES (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 1983).
27. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974).
28. Thomas L. Hungerford, Tax Expenditures: Good, Bad, or Ugly?, 113 TAX NOTES
325, 333 (2006). This figure reflects social welfare tax expenditures that cover all
income classes, and include, in addition to the EITC and CTC, incentives to
encourage retirement saving, charitable contributions, higher education, and
homeownership.
29. Larry Zelenak, for instance, has argued recently that the EITC should be
designed “to function as an adjustment to the minimum wage based on family size.”
Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-Size Adjustment
to the Minimum Wage, 57 TAX. L. REV. 301, 302 (2004).
30. Senator Russell Long (D-LA), the political progenitor of the EITC, dubbed a
similar predecessor plan the “work bonus.” Ventry, supra note 10, at 22.
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scale rather than to the top? Are we bolstering a weak and ineffective
social safety net? Or are we protecting what the Congressional
Research Service recently called, when referring to the EITC, the
31
country’s “largest anti-poverty entitlement program?”
Correspondingly, for whom are we fighting? Low-income workers?
Their children? Persons below the poverty line? Persons above the
poverty line? The transitionally unemployed? Or are we concerned
about secondary earners who face significant disincentives to enter
the labor market due to high marginal tax rates? Without yet
offering answers to these questions, let us turn to our third thematic
question.
Question #3: Are our current tax-transfer efforts effectively assisting the
targeted beneficiaries?
Transfer programs that run through the tax code help persons who
pay taxes. If you do not have taxable income, tax-transfer programs
do not help you, at least currently. But “work,” as discussed supra in
connection with Professor Zatz’s findings, is broader than paid
32
employment.
In very real terms, the EITC, as a “work support”
program, discriminates among different kinds of workers, and
distributes anti-poverty benefits only to one category of persons living
in poverty; it supplements the income of paid workers but neglects
33
unpaid workers.
In addition, low-income individuals engaged in
unpaid work may be ineligible for EITC benefits but considered
34
The
“working” for other transfer programs, including TANF.
different treatment of “work” under the two programs raises serious
concerns about horizontal equity (that is, the equal treatment of
equals). Two individuals, one “working” in paid employment and the
other “working” in unpaid employment (with income from nonemployment sources), and each with identical incomes, are treated
differently under the EITC. Yet if both of these workers are equally
deserving of assistance—they have equal incomes, after all, and are
both engaged in work-oriented activities—then “it is hard to see—
from an anti-poverty perspective” why one would be helped while the
31. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC):
AN OVERVIEW 27 app. (2007) [hereinafter CRS REPORT ON EITC].
32. Supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
33. Zatz, supra note 22, at 1180-84.
34. Id. at 1177-78. In fact, the EITC explicitly excludes from “earned income”
payments made to TANF recipients on condition that they perform “work
experience” or “community service.” See I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(v) (2000); Treatment
of Certain Payments Received as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
I.R.S. Notice 99-3, 1999-1 C.B. 271 (1999).
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other would be on the outside looking in. The discrimination is
further unjustified after accounting for the observation that the EITC
extends benefits to low-wage workers in non-poor families; that is,
workers less “deserving” from an economic perspective than the
36
hypothetical individual described above.
If the target beneficiaries of tax transfers include all low-income,
working Americans, running social welfare through the tax system
excludes many members of that group. Of course, we could adopt a
37
universal tax credit, such as the one proposed by Professor Forman,
which would provide benefits as a matter of right and not as a
consequence of paid employment. But we tried that already, and it
did not work; in fact, it failed miserably. The negative income tax
component of President Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan provided
38
higher payments to non-workers than to workers; moreover, paid
employment under the plan reduced a recipient’s benefits, providing
unambiguous disincentives to work, much like the effect of a
39
universal tax credit. A universal credit is a negative income tax, and
a negative income tax, at least in the popular imagination, equals
welfare.
To the extent we see tax credits as the solution to all of our antipoverty woes, we are in serious trouble. Tax transfers can be
powerful anti-poverty tools. Witness the combination of the EITC
and the CTC, which, along with recent increases in the standard
deduction and a wider fifteen percent tax bracket, provides a tax
threshold of almost $42,000 for a family of four and nearly $62,000
40
for a family of six. But we can lean on these programs only so much.
If we shift our entire system of social provisions to the tax system, all
the problems that previously plagued, say, welfare policy or health
35. Zatz, supra note 22, at 1183.
36. See Holtzblatt Interview, supra note 11, at 62 (noting that “not all low-wage
workers come from low-income families”).
37. Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
38. Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
39. The Nixon administration emphasized the work-oriented features of FAP,
including its lower marginal tax rates compared to existing welfare programs,
mandatory registration for claimants at employment offices for work or vocational
training, and additional day care and transportation services. Ultimately, this
campaign was unsuccessful as critics managed to associate the program with the dole,
a government “handout” rather than a “hand up.” Ventry, supra note 10, at 19-23. A
universal tax credit would have to employ either a phase out for benefits or a phase
in of positive tax liability in order to mitigate the unambiguous disincentives to work
associated with a lump-sum subsidy at the bottom of the income scale.
40. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX THRESHOLDS FOR
SELECTED YEARS: 1996 THROUGH 2006 3 tbl.1 (2005), available at http://opencrs.cdt.o
rg/document/RS22337.

VENTRY.OFFTOPRINTER

1272

6/11/2007 9:20:37 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:5

care policy will likely persist under the stewardship of tax officials. In
fact, new problems will likely emerge as the tax system assumes
responsibilities it was not designed to shoulder, and as policymakers
shift responsibilities—perhaps for political rather than informed
reasons—from direct expenditure programs to tax expenditure
programs. The recent attempt by Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) to
expand the EITC’s role as a wage subsidy in order to avoid raising the
minimum wage is just one example of what can happen when
41
policymakers begin to view tax credits as a policymaking panacea.
II. HOW WE CAN “SAVE” THE EITC
By raising so many questions as to the nature and purpose of lowincome tax credits, I hope to clarify rather than problematize our
reliance on tax-transfer programs. To be frank, however, there is an
inherent danger in this clarification project. Tax-transfer programs
like the EITC have enjoyed political success largely because of
confusion—rather than clarity—over what they are and what they are
not. Indeed, the EITC gained bipartisan support over the years
because it has meant different things to different people. For
Republicans, it is a reward for working, while for Democrats, it is an
anti-poverty program. By clarifying with precision what we are trying
to accomplish with tax-transfer programs such as the EITC, we run
the risk of disturbing the delicate balance of bipartisanship that many
42
of these programs currently enjoy.
In fact, some commentators suggest that the EITC is already in
mortal danger. Dorothy Brown raises the specter that the EITC may
43
be “repealed outright,” and that the program “is headed for
44
extinction or at least the ‘end of the EITC as we know it.’” Congress
41. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RESPONSE TO A REQUEST BY SENATOR
GRASSLEY ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF INCREASING THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE VERSUS
EXPANDING THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 2 (2007), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7721/01-09-MinimumWageEITC.pdf
(examining the effect on low-wage hourly workers of hypothetical minimum wage
raises and EITC expansions to predict that both “would have increased total EITC
payments by roughly $2.4 billion in 2004, with workers in poor families receiving $1.4
billion of that total”).
42. Noah Zatz has made a similar observation with respect to “the sensitivity of
work definitions,” and the “uneasy . . . alliance” of those “who purport to agree on
the importance of work.” Noah Zatz, What Welfare Requires From Work, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 373, 378 (2006).
43. Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
790, 810 (2007).
44. Id. at 1. A significant percentage of overclaims from the 1999 study (nearly
twenty-five percent) was due to errors relating to the confusing qualifying child rules.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT

VENTRY.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

6/11/2007 9:20:37 PM

WELFARE BY ANY OTHER NAME

1273

reacted aggressively in 2003 upon learning that as much as 31.7% of
45
total EITC claims for tax year 1999 should not have been paid.
Congressional pressure to reduce overpayments prompted the IRS to
roll out a pilot “certification” program for a limited number of EITC
46
claimants.
The program amounted to a pre-return audit for all
EITC eligibles swept up in its net, a number the IRS hoped would
47
reach ten percent of all EITC participants when fully phased in.
Compared to audit rates of less than one percent for the general
taxpayer population, the scrutiny paid low-income taxpayers
48
appeared draconian. In addition, since 1998, the IRS has allocated
49
over $1 billion of its budget to auditing low-income taxpayers, such
that low-income audits comprised fifty percent of all individual
50
income tax examinations between 2000 and 2003; if you were poor
during those years, you were audited more than four times as
CLAIMED ON 1999 RETURNS 13 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/compesteitc99.pdf [hereinafter COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES]. Congress responded by
requiring that dependents report taxpayer identification numbers (typically, social
security numbers), permitting the IRS to match EITC claimants with the Federal
Case Registry of Child Support Orders, and enacting the Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, 118 Stat. 1166 (2004), which created a more
uniform definition for tax purposes.
45. COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 44, at 3.
46. I.R.S. Announcement 2003-40, 2003-26 I.R.B. 1132, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb03-26.pdf. For a summary of Announcement
2003-40, see IRS Describes Changes, Seeks Comments on EITC Pilot Program, TAX NOTES
TODAY, June 16, 2003. For excellent discussions of the program, see James L.
Rockney, Prove It or Lose It: The Certification Program for Select Individuals Claiming the
Earned Income Tax Credit, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 49 (2004); Zelenak, supra note 13; Janet
Spragens & Nancy Abramowitz, Low-Income Taxpayers and the Modernized IRS: A View
from the Trenches, 107 TAX NOTES 1407, 1407 (2005).
47. Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1870.
48. Stephen Joyce, IRS Official Says Personal Audits to Rise, Corporate Audit Strategies
Being Developed, DAILY TAX REP., 245 DTR G-7 (Dec. 21, 2006).
For the
overwhelmingly negative response to the certification program from academics,
practitioners, public interest organizations, and other special interests, see Robert
Greenstein, The New Procedures for the Earned Income Tax Credit, 99 TAX NOTES 1525,
1525 (2003); Wade Henderson, Civil Rights Coalition Comments on EITC Precertification,
100 TAX NOTES 1265, 1265 (2003); Sandra Hernandez, Community Foundation Opposes
EITC Precertification, 100 TAX NOTES 897, 897 (2003); H&R Block Wants EITC
Precertification Pilot Program Deleted, 100 TAX NOTES 1264, 1264 (2003); Kerry Korpi,
Federation Opposes EITC Precertification, 100 TAX NOTES 897, 897 (2003); Gifford Miller,
New York City Council Objects to EITC Precertification Pilot Program, 100 TAX NOTES 1011,
1011 (2003); Paula Roberts, Group Finds EITC Plan Troublesome, 100 TAX NOTES 1265,
1265 (2003); Marybeth Shinn, Professor Comments on EITC Precertification, 100 TAX
NOTES 1264, 1264 (2003); Janet Spragens, Nancy Abramowitz & Leslie Book,
Professors Comment on EITC Precertification, 100 TAX NOTES 847, 847 (2003).
49. Brown, supra note 43, at 790. This figure includes $150 million in annual
earmarked appropriations to combat EITC error rates, the only such line-item
compliance appropriation for any provision in the tax code. Holtzblatt & McCubbin,
supra note 13, at 161.
50. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES
THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2003 8 (2004).
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51

frequently as any other taxpayer.
And just over a year ago, the
Taxpayer Advocate Service (“TAS”) reported that between 2001 and
2005 nearly 1.6 million low-income taxpayers had their refunds
frozen without notice and deemed fraudulent under the IRS’s
52
“questionable refund program” (“QRP”). In two-thirds of the cases,
TAS found no evidence of fraud, and the wrongfully accused
taxpayers ultimately received at least one hundred percent of the
53
refunds originally claimed on their returns.
These attacks on low-income taxpayers and their tax-transfer
benefits are serious. But doomsayers overstate the threat. The EITC
is neither in danger of being “repealed outright” nor “headed for
54
extinction.” This is not 1994 when the Republican Contract with
55
America explicitly associated the EITC with the old welfare regime.
Nor is it 1995 when voices in the popular press were calling the EITC
56
“the biggest . . . transfer swindle in the history of the nation,” and
members of Congress labeled the credit “the fastest growing, most
57
fraudulent program that we have in Government today,” which
allowed low-income tax cheats to make “millions of dollars . . . by
58
scam.”
Moreover, the certification program that some
commentators point to as foreshadowing the “end of the EITC as we
51. Book, supra note 12, at 374. See also DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL:
THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND
CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE 130 (2003) (reporting that the IRS audited 397,000 of EITC
claimants in 2001, “eight times as many audits as it conducted of people making
$100,000 or more”); Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But
Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755, 777 (2005) (citing a similar figure of 4 times the audit
rate for poor taxpayers).
52. For coverage and reaction to the QRP, see David Brunori, The Refund Freeze
Program Warrants Outrage, 110 TAX NOTES 275, 275 (2006); Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS
Froze Refunds, Study Says; Taxpayers Had No Chance to Respond to Fraud Suspicions, WASH.
POST, Jan. 11, 2006, at D1; David Cay Johnston, IRS Move Said to Hurt the Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at C1; Allen Kenney, Capital Hill Hot Over Frozen Refunds, 110
TAX NOTES 303, 303 (2006); Allen Kenney, IRS to Review Frozen Refund Program,
Everson Says, 110 TAX NOTES 433, 433 (2006); Allen Kenney, Olson Drops Refund
Bombshell, 110 TAX NOTES 183, 183 (2006); Crystal Tandon, IRS to Give Taxpayers Notice
of Frozen Refunds, 110 TAX NOTES 698, 698 (2006).
53. Crenshaw, supra note 52; Johnston, supra note 52.
54. Supra notes 43-44.
55. See generally CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REPRESENTATIVE
NEWT GINGRICH, REPRESENTATIVE DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO
CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (exploring the
Republican Contract with America and its implications for tax reform and the EITC).
56. MARTIN L. GROSS, THE TAX RACKET: GOVERNMENT EXTORTION FROM A TO Z 137
(1995); see also James Aley, A Tax Credit for Crooks?, FORTUNE, Oct. 4, 1993, at 24
(discussing the incidence of allegedly fraudulent returns under the EITC).
57. Senate Begins Debate on Budget Bill, Remarks of Senator Don Nickles (R-OK), TAX
NOTES TODAY, Nov. 7, 1995.
58. Unofficial Transcript of June 8 Senate Finance Hearing on EITC, Remarks of Senator
William Roth (R-DE), TAX NOTES TODAY, June 15, 1995.
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59

know it,” covers just twenty-five thousand of the twenty-two million
EITC recipients, or slightly more than one-tenth of one percent of all
60
recipients. In 1995, critics of the EITC sponsored legislation to slash
the program by $50 billion over ten years; between 1996 and 2004,
61
however, EITC payments jumped from $26 billion to $40.6 billion.
To the extent a small number of EITC claimants are required to
precertify their eligibility for benefits, or that otherwise EITC eligibles
shown to have made erroneous claims in previous years are prevented
62
from claiming the EITC for as many as ten years (for fraud), is, to
my mind, a realistic price to pay. Failure to sufficiently reduce
compliance rates after nearly twenty years of legislative and
administrative efforts and billions of compliance dollars forced
Congress to adopt a more rigorous and intrusive compliance strategy,
63
one that resembles traditional welfare programs.
Given the
aggressive compliance efforts directed at direct-transfer programs,
the “real surprise” is not that Congress and the IRS overreacted to
EITC error rates (which continue to far outpace comparable rates for
welfare programs), but that EITC recipients “are not made to go
through the eligibility and verification gauntlet in the same manner
64
as other benefits’ recipients.”
Therefore, with respect to “how we can save the EITC,” the EITC
does not need saving. The war over the future of the program was
65
fought and won by its supporters ten years ago. Recent compliance
efforts directed at the EITC do not in any way endanger the program,
66
unless, as others have argued, we overreact to what amounts to
reasonable oversight of the nation’s largest anti-poverty program.
59. Brown, supra note 43, at 1.
60. Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1871-72.
61. CRS REPORT ON EITC, supra note 31, at 1.
62. I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B) provides a ten-year disallowance period if there is a final
determination that the erroneous claim for EITC benefits was due to fraud. The
same provision provides a two-year disallowance period if there is a final
determination that the erroneous claim was due to reckless or intentional disregard
of rules or regulations.
63. Error rates have fallen from a high of thirty-nine percent in the late 1980s, see
Sholz, supra note 18, at 68, to between twenty-three and twenty-eight percent,
Telephone Interview with Janet Holtzblatt, supra note 15, but still reached almost
thirty-two percent as recently as 1999, COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES, supra note 44.
64. Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the
Working Poor through the Tax System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1103, 1129.
65. For a discussion of this battle, see Ventry, supra note 10, at 32-41. In a recent
telephone conversation with the author, Janet Holtzblatt (a Treasury economist and
high-ranking official who has participated in the development of the EITC for more
than fifteen years) stated that the “war was the 1990s.” Telephone Interview with
Janet Holtzblatt, supra note 15.
66. Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1916 (“Vociferous objections [to recent
compliance efforts] could easily backfire, in either of two ways. First, the objections
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III. CHARTING THE EITC’S FUTURE: REDUCING ERRORS, RAISING
AWARENESS, AND EXPANDING COVERAGE
I do not mean to imply that proponents of low-income tax-transfer
programs should rest on their laurels. Rather, as I have argued
elsewhere, tax-transfer advocates must be mindful of social and
67
political winds, and shape their advocacy accordingly. There will
always be critics who think refundable tax credits have “no business in
68
the tax system,” and that tax credits for the poor are “turn[ing] our
69
income tax code into a welfare system.”
These criticisms are
important and potentially devastating. They require tax-transfer
advocates to acknowledge fairly the shortcomings associated with
delivering transfers to low-income individuals through the tax system.
They also require advocates and administrators to address directly
those shortcomings, to reduce unacceptably high noncompliance
rates, research the labor participation effects of tax-transfer
programs, model optimal delivery of transfers through the tax code,
and assist eligible low-income taxpayers in claiming the credit.
Some recent efforts are exemplary. In early 2007, responding not
only to excessive noncompliance rates but also to growing
nonparticipation rates (which may run as high as twenty-five
70
percent ), the IRS launched an aggressive educational campaign to
help eligible low-income taxpayers claim the EITC for tax year 2006.
On February 1, 2007, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and IRS
Commissioner Mark Everson announced “EITC Awareness Day” as
part of a concerted effort to inform taxpayers about the EITC and the
might lead Congress to reject the EITC-as-tax analogy in favor of the EITC-as-welfare
analogy, and so to transfer the program from the IRS to the welfare bureaucracy (or
to keep the program within the IRS but to require universal precertification).
Second, Congress might initially defer to the objections and refrain from special
EITC compliance initiatives, only to decide later that the level of noncompliance was
unacceptable and that the entire credit should therefore be repealed.”). Book, supra
note 64, at 1129 (agreeing with Zelenak and noting “how good EITC claimants have
it”).
67. Ventry, supra note 10, at 47 (concluding that social policy alternatives run
through the tax system must “complement rather than conflict with social and
cultural forces to prove successful”).
68. Transcript of Tax Analysts Conference on Tax Reform and Simplicity Now Available,
TAX NOTES TODAY, July 19, 2005 (quoting Don Alexander, former Commissioner of
the IRS).
69. James Toedtman, Tax Break for Working Poor; But House and Senate Measures
Still Differ, NEWSDAY, June 13, 2003, at A08 (quoting Republican Representative
Spencer Bachus of Alabama); see also Kathy M. Kristof, IRS Publicizes Tax Credit for
Working Poor, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, at C3 (“The earned income tax credit is more
of a welfare program than a tax break.”).
70. I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-24 (Feb. 1, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov
/newsroom/article/0,,id=167470,00.html.
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71

availability of free tax filing assistance. More than 150 coalitions and
partners across the country marked EITC Awareness Day with news
72
conferences, press releases, and media coverage. On January 31,
2007, the United Way and Bank of America announced a new
national initiative, which included a $500,000 grant to help lowincome individuals obtain tax preparation assistance and unrealized
73
tax refunds through the EITC.
In addition, at a Congressional
hearing on February 13, 2007, lawmakers expressed less concern
about EITC noncompliance than nonparticipation. “I would think
the IRS would be outraged that so many who qualify are not applying
for that money,” Representative Xavier Becerra (D-CA) told IRS
74
witnesses. He continued, “I hope that there is a sense within IRS
75
that we should not tolerate this. We have to light a fire under IRS.”
Finally, on March 1, 2007, House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Charles Rangel (D-NY) visited a low-income tax
preparation clinic with Secretary Paulson and Commissioner Everson
76
to further raise EITC awareness at the grass-roots level.
In addition to lawmakers and administrators, academics and policy
experts have offered important proposals to improve the program.
Francine Lipman has shown that a significant amount of EITC
benefits ($1.75 billion in 2002) go toward preparation and privatesector delivery costs of the program rather than to the low-income
77
target beneficiaries. Also mindful of the large percentage of EITC
payments going to tax return preparers and banks, Leslie Book has
argued for shifting compliance costs to the return preparation
78
industry.
As a starting point in its noncompliance efforts, Book
urges the government to “consider strategies that are less likely to
require significant administrative costs or to decrease participation
among eligible participants. To that end, the government should
shift additional compliance costs onto commercial tax-return
79
preparers.” Book’s recommendation seems particularly appropriate
given the disproportionate number of EITC claimants relying on paid
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. IRS, Treasury to Promote EITC Day, DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 1, 2007, at G-14.
74. Diane Freda, Lawmakers Say IRS Must Do More to Heighten Taxpayer Awareness of
EITC, DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 14, 2007, at G-10.
75. Id.
76. Paulson, Everson, Rep. Rangel Move to Raise EITC Awareness, DAILY TAX REP.,
Mar. 2, 2007, at G-5.
77. Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing
the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 461, 470.
78. Book, supra note 64, at 1109.
79. Id.
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80

preparers, as well as the large percentage of EITC overclaims
81
associated with returns prepared and filed by commercial preparers.
The most important task for proponents of the EITC will be to
continue differentiating it and other tax-transfer programs from
welfare. This will be no easy undertaking. Apart from the stubborn
error rates, the EITC amounts to a hybrid tax-welfare program
whether we want to admit it or not. As Larry Zelenak has artfully
shown, the EITC operates as a welfare program in terms of its
economic effect and as a tax program in terms of its administrative
82
effect.
Consider that nearly eighty-eight percent of the EITC is
refunded to claimants as cash payments, with only twelve percent
83
“Neither fish nor fowl,” Leslie Book has
offsetting taxes owed.
84
observed, “the EITC is part welfare, part tax credit.”
Given the above refund-to-offset ratio, critics could argue quite
credibly that the EITC is disproportionately welfare, and only marginally
tax credit. Such an association with welfare is deadly, and almost
killed the EITC in the 1990s. Although current political realities
necessitate a strategy of defining tax-transfer programs opposite
welfare, that approach is not without risk. As Anne Alstott observed
in the midst of the 1990s battle over the EITC, cloaking the program
80. In 2001, the percentage of lower-income EITC claimants paying someone to
prepare their returns (67%) was measurably higher than that of non-EITC claimants
(59.4%). INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC) PROGRAM
EFFECTIVENESS AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT FY 2002-FY 2003 4 (2003), available at
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-utl/eitc_effectiveness.pdf. The number of EITC
claimants using paid preparers continues to go up. Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax
Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1145, 1173 (2003); see also
Elaine Maag, Tax Preparation for Low-Income Households, Knowledge of the EITC, 108 TAX
NOTES 555 (Aug. 2, 2005); ALAN BERUBE, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE NEW SAFETY NET:
HOW THE TAX CODE HELPED LOW-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES DURING THE EARLY 2000S
9 (2006), http://www.brookings.edu/rios/data/sources/report/
bb76a464bdf9ff3f800089600a1415cb.xml (reporting that seventy-one percent of
EITC claimants used paid preparers in 2003).
81. Of the estimated $11.1 billion in EITC overpayments in 1999, Holtzblatt and
McCubbin, supra note 13, at 164, roughly fifty-seven percent were attributable to
returns prepared by commercial preparers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, NATIONAL
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 270 (2003). This figure
compares unfavorably to an error rate of 34.6% for all taxpayers using commercial
preparers and 37.8% for those not using commercial preparers. Book, supra note 64,
at 1117. See also ACORN FINANCIAL JUSTICE CENTER, INCREASING INCOMES & REDUCING
THE RAPID REFUND RIP-OFF: EXPANDING ACCESS TO THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT FOR
WORKING FAMILIES WHILE REDUCING RELIANCE ON REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS (2004),
available at http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/ACORN_Reports/National_EITC_Rep
ort_Final_version_01.pdf.
82. Zelenak, supra note 13, at 1873.
83. CRS REPORT ON EITC, supra note 31, at 9. The ratio of refund to offset has
grown since the program’s inception. In 1975, seventy-two percent of benefits were
refunded as cash payments compared to eighty-eight percent in 2004. Id.
84. Book, supra note 64, at 1125.
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in anti-welfare garb may in fact “attract maximum political support.”
But advocating the EITC “as the answer to the problems of welfare”
could also fuel “inflated expectations about the capabilities of
redistributive programs and reinforce[] negative attitudes about
welfare that, in the long run, may jeopardize the cause of the EITC
86
and of poverty relief more generally.” Alstott is right: we must not
ask too much of programs like the EITC. But proponents of taxtransfer programs, especially the EITC, may be able to exploit current
welfare politics to their advantage. For instance, Noah Zatz has
argued that work-oriented transfer programs and the obsession with
traditional justifications for work, such as self-sufficiency, selfimprovement, and the ethic of giving back to society, provide an
87
opportunity to expand the membership of the “deserving” poor. In
particular, Zatz “challenges the dominance of market work” on its
“home turf” by showing that familial caretaking and home work—
excluded from the “privileged place historically granted to wage
work”—provides the same benefits associated with paid market
88
In this way, Zatz paves the way for a politically viable
work.
integration of nonmarket care into market work, a truly revolutionary
accomplishment.
Thus, welfare politics, somewhat counterintuitively, may provide
opportunities for expanding rather than contracting social provision
in the United States. Exploiting welfare politics may be a suboptimal
way to advocate a more inclusive social welfare state. But the political
arena often forces its participants to adopt imperfect solutions,
particularly with respect to tax-transfer programs, which have thrived
over the last generation because they were characterized as tax
programs rather than as welfare programs.
Political realities
continue to force proponents of these programs to emphasize—even
over-emphasize—the differences between transfer payments
associated with work, and transfer payments received as a matter of
right, as an entitlement of citizenship in a rich and democratic state.
85. Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 537 (1995).
86. Id.
87. See Zatz, supra note 42 (discussing the legitimacy of work requirements linked
to welfare receipt). See also Zatz, supra note 22, at 1136-37 (explaining three primary
purposes for linking work with social benefit programs).
88. Zatz, supra note 42, at 461. According to Zatz, “family labor has all the
versatility of paid work: It can contribute to immediate self-sufficiency (if care is
acknowledged as a need), can provide a number of experiences sometimes
associated with job satisfaction (depending in part on how care is organized), and
can give back to society (if parent-to-child benefits count).” Id. at 457.
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CONCLUSION
In the United States, social welfare programs run through the tax
code have been hugely successful, both from the standpoint of
delivering benefits to needy recipients and generating bipartisan
political support. Tax transfers enjoy lower administrative costs than
direct transfers, as well as higher participation rates and less potential
for arbitrary discretion at the hands of case workers. In addition, tax
transfers such as the EITC reward work, thereby deflecting potential
criticism that recipients are “living off the dole” and “becoming
public charges.”
Still, the shadow of “welfare” hangs over all forms of social
provision, whether run through the tax system or the direct
expenditure budget. Policymakers need to remain sensitive to
criticisms that tax transfers amount to welfare payments, and that taxtransfer recipients should be subject to the same administrative
scrutiny and eligibility requirements as welfare recipients. Such
sensitivity, however, also requires policymakers to extol the virtues of
tax transfers without undermining the usefulness of direct-transfer
programs. Celebrating the work incentive features of the EITC that
emphasize paid employment, for instance, should not delegitimize
the more expansive—and creative—work incentive features of TANF.
Rather, such a comparison should encourage policymakers to
consider what counts as “work” worthy of public support in a society
where work takes all forms, both market as well as nonmarket and
paid as well as unpaid. Broader conceptions of work translate into
broader social supports, some of which should be delivered through
the tax system—for administrative, political, cultural, or economic
reasons—and some of which should be delivered through the direct
expenditure budget. Indeed, for the U.S. tax-transfer system to build
on its three-decade run of success, policymakers need not only
appreciate the history of social welfare and the tax code, but also its
untapped potential to further alleviate poverty and provide
opportunity for low-income Americans.

